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Abstract: "Bottom up" governance. "Self-organization."
These are among the most talismanic virtue-words of
modern political discourse. Yet the reality is that in politics,
"self-organization" is rare, being hard to initiate and even
harder to sustain. As Oscar Wilde once complained about
socialism, it "requires too many evenings." Governance as
we tend to know it depends primarily on hierarchical
institutions, or on close coordination within small groups.
True partnerships, conversations among engaged equals, do
not seem to scale. Indeed, whether one believes the
fundamental problem to be something about the economics
of group formation, the iron law of oligarchy, or something
in between, experience demonstrates repeatedly that the
problem of group self-organization, not to mention self-
governance, is all too real both in politics and other walks of
life. Enthusiasts of modern communications have not been
slow to point out the ways in which the Internet (and the cell
phone) change the ways in which all types of groups form
and communicate. For example, Internet-based 'social
software' drastically lowers the cost of group formation and
offers at least the potential of tools that may make group
self-governance more practicable.
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While this optimism is valuable and may some day be
realized, the current reality falls far short of the ideal and
seems likely to do so for the foreseeable future. This paper
suggests that existing institutions could be harnessed to grow
the tools and nurture the conditions that promote self-
organization of groups and democratic decentralized self-
governance. I identify eight specific governmental policies
that could usefully be adopted in any relatively wealthy
liberal democracy to promote the formation of groups and
assist them once they are formed:
1. Democratizing access to communication by ensuring that
the communications infrastructure is widely deployed,
inexpensive, and of suitable quality.
2. Enact legal reform (if not already in place) to prevent
cyber-SLAPP lawsuits.
3. Apply competition law aggressively to markets for
communications technologies in order to ensure that no
software or hardware maker can exert control over
citizens' means of communication.
4. Provide reliable data, and act as honest archivist.
5. Assist those who desire aid (but only them) to fight spam
and other forms of discursive sabotage.
6. Ensure that Meetup-like services are available at low (or
no) cost (if demand for these key services proves to be
elastic as to price) and subsidize facilitative technologies,
such as group decision-making software.
7. Enact a digital workers rights policy including a
component that encourages digital or even physical
meetings.
8. Provide a corps of subsidized online neutrals to settle
non-commercial disputes among members of virtual
communities.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At the start of this campaign we had a very simple idea
which is: Change in America doesn't start from the top
down, it starts from the bottom up. That change is brought
about because ordinary people do extraordinary things.
- Barack Obama, Aug. 27, 20081
"Bottom up" governance and "self-organization" are among the
most talismanic virtue-words of modern political discourse. Yet the
reality is that in politics, "self-organization" is rare, being hard to
initiate and even harder to sustain. As Oscar Wilde is reputed to have
complained about socialism, it "requires too many evenings." 2
Governance as we tend to know it depends primarily on hierarchical
institutions, or on close coordination within small groups. True
partnerships, conversations among engaged equals, do not seem to
scale. Indeed, whether one believes the fundamental problem to be
something about the economics of group formation, the iron law of
oligarchy, or something in between, experience demonstrates
repeatedly that the problem of group self-organization, not to mention
self-governance, is all too real both in politics and other walks of life.
Enthusiasts of modern communications have not been slow to
point out the ways in which the Internet (and the cell phone) change
the ways in which all types of groups form and communicate. For
example, Internet-based 'social software' such as Facebook, Meetup,
and MySpace3 drastically lowers the cost of group formation and
I Kevin Vaughan, Stormy Primary Season Left Behind as Clinton Throws Votes to Obama,
ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEws, Aug. 28, 2oo8,
http://www.rockymountainnews.com/news/2oo8/aug/28/stormy-primary-season-left-
behind-as-clinton-to.
2 OSCAR WILDE, A LIFE IN QUOTES 238 (Barry Day ed., 2000).
3 There is a growing legal literature looking at the legal and social consequences of these
tools, including Dina Epstein, Have I Been Googled?: Character and Fitness in the Age of
Google, Facebook, and Youtube, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 715 (2OO8) (exploring the ways
in which traditional bar admission standards interact with the way current law students
share information online); Robert P. Latham, Carl C. Butzer & Jeremy T. Brown, Legal
Implications of User-Generated Content: Youtube, MySpace, and Facebook, 20 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 1 (2o08) (discussing issues of intellectual property rights, defamation,
and privacy rights as related to user-generated content); Matt Maher, You've Got
Messages: Modern Technology Recruiting Through Text-Messaging and the
Intrusiveness ofFacebook, 8 TEx. REV. ENT. & SPORTS L. 125 (2007) (addressing the use of
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offers at least the potential of tools that may make group self-
governance more practicable. In its current form, social software has
many virtues, and some vices, but aiding self-governance does not
seem to be chief among either.
In November 2004, the British think tank Demos, an influential
advisor to then-Prime Minister Tony Blair and the New Labor Party,
issued an iconoclastic paper entitled The Pro-Am Revolution.4 Demos
argued that advances in technology and culture increasingly are being
driven by a new breed of serious hobbyist: "amateurs who work to
professional standards."5 Accordingly, the paper was infelicitously
text messages, Facebook, and MySpace in the recruitment of high school athletes by NCAA
athletic coaches); Cheryl J. Eisner, MySpace in a Post-Grokster World: Digital Finger
Pointing for Offenses Perpetrated Through Use of Social Networking Sites After MGM v.
Grokster, 6 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL'Y & ETHICS J. 467 (2oo8) (using the case of MySpace v.
Doe to determine whether or not courts should impose secondary liability on interactive
computer services for illegal acts committed through the websites); Matthew C. Ruedy,
Repercussions of a MySpace Teen Suicide: Should Anti-Cyberbullying Laws Be Created?,
9 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 323 (2OO8) (discussing the issues and challenges associated with
creating cyber bullying laws, from the decision to create such laws in the first place, to the
difficult First Amendment restrictions posed by the "true threat" and "imminent
incitement" doctrines); Ryan Lex, Can MySpace nm Into My Lawsuit?: The Application
of Defamation Law to Online Social Networks, 28 Loy. LA ENT. L. REV. 47 (20o8)
(applying the history of defamation on the Internet to the current generation of MySpace
users); Patricia Sanchez Abril, A (My)Space of One's Own: On Privacy and Social
Networks, 6 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 73 (2007) (putting forth reasons why privacy
and personality should be protected on online social networking sites); James
Grimmelmann, Facebook and the Social Dynamic of Privacy (August 25, 2oo8)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with New York Law School), available at
http://papers.ssr.com/o13/papers.cfrn?abstractid=1262822 (describing the social
privacy dynamics on social sites like Facebook and then evaluating various policy
interventions); Adam Thierer, The MySpace-Ag Agreement: A Model of Conduct for Social
Networking, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/so3/papers.cfm?abstractid=10922o6
(raising questions of privacy and security in the aftermath of the Principles of Social
Networking agreement between MySpace and the forty-nine state Attorney Generals);
Sheerin N. S. Haubenreich, Parental Rights in MySpace: Reconceptualizing the State's
Parens Patriae Role in the Digital Age, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/o13/papers.cftn?abstractid=1217872 (postulating the
government should act to ensure minors do not cause themselves any long term harm from
their internet social activities).
4 DEMOS, THE PRO-AM REVOLUTION (2004),
http://www.demos.co.uk/proamrevolutionfinal-pdLmedia-public.aspx (last visited Jan.
21, 2009) [hereinafter Demos].
5 Id. at 12. Others have questioned the claim that this is new, and also the claim that it is
any greater than it used to be. See, e.g., Stuart Cohen, No Renegade Group Behind Linux,
BUSINESS WEEK, May 6, 2005,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/may2005/tc2005o56-117.htm,
which argues that as regards open source programming, this story is largely a myth:
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titled "The Pro-Am Revolution." The work of these Pro-Ams, Demos
argued, increases 'cultural capital': "when Pro-Ams are networked
together they can have a huge impact on politics and culture,
economics and development. Pro-Ams can achieve things that until
recently only large, professional organisations could achieve." 6 It
follows, argued Demos, that if this new class is valuable, it should be
encouraged, even subsidized, by the British government.
While I disagree with several of Demos's specific suggestions-
notably the idea of direct subsidies-the underlying idea motivating
the Pro-Am paper offers a healthy challenge: if we do generally agree
that the public sphere, or civil society, or our life together, would be
improved by having more self-organized groups and self-governing
institutions, then how exactly does one get from here to there? More
specifically, what role is there for government to play in encouraging
the rise of new groups and new self-governing institutions? Does it
even make any sense to think of building the bottom up from the top
down, or is the role of academics and especially policy-makers limited
to that of participant-observers and cheerleaders waiting for the
public to spontaneously organize itself? This paper is an attempt to
respond to that challenge.
Good discourse is at the center of liberal democratic theory. Many
modem democratic theorists, such as Jiirgen Habermas, rely on the
right sort of discourse as a fundamental justification for the legal or
political system.7 Many other democratic theories treat discourse-
whether labeled political speech or the marketplace of ideas-as an
essential element of a healthy, functioning polity.8 If discourse is so
the romantic notion that Linux is the product of a freewheeling, loosely affiliated
band of thousands of independent hackers collectively turning their backs on the
status quo is no longer an accurate description of the Linux community- and
hasn't been the case for many years.
Looking at the top 25 contributors to the Linux kernel today, you'll discover that
more than 9o% of them are on the corporate payroll full-time for companies such
as HP Latest News about HP, IBM, IntelRelevant Products/Services from Intel,
Novell Latest News about Novell, Oracle Latest News about Oracle, Red Hat
Latest News about Red Hat and Veritas Latest News about Veritas, among many
others.
6 Demos, supra note 4, at 12.
7 See JURGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE
THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg trans., MIT Press 1996).
8 E.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (stating that the First
Amendment is designed "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
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central to democratic government, then finding ways to enable and
improve the quantity and quality of the sorts of groups that nurture
good discourse should be one of our very highest priorities.9
In the United States today, there is widespread concern that
communitarian institutions are weakening. Robert Putnam's thesis
that Americans are now "bowling alone" instead of in leagues 10
captures an intuition that the nation which was once famously a
"nation of joiners" is now in the grip of a suburban anomie. The
substantial weakening of the union movement in the U.S. and
elsewhere, the decline of the workingmen's clubs in the UK, these and
many parallel developments remove occasions for people to organize,
although some new movements and occasions such as school Parent-
Teacher Associations partly replace them. More recently, changes in
the nature of the workplace-the rise of the home-office", and the
increase in call-out bid markets for even professional services12-
suggest that increasingly people will interact with the market as
individuals rather than as part of a team. In the future we may not
just be bowling alone, but working alone. This seems unlikely to help
groups to form, much less inculcate people in the habits of community
and cooperation that make self-governance practicable.
There is a problem here, and it needs solving. It would be nice to
provide a comprehensive roadmap for the creation and nurturing of
self-governance among spontaneously formed groups, a Habermasian
community in a box. Unfortunately, this paper is, at best, a stepping
will ultimately prevail"); ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (Harper Press
196o); THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 7 (Random House
1970); but see Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (rejecting
right-of-reply requirement for non-scarcity media).
9 Works that do address these issues include CHARLES J. Fox & HUGH T. MILLER,
POSTMODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: TOWARDS DISCOURSE (Sage Publications 1995);
and BRUCE ACKERMAN & JAMES FISHKIN, DELIBERATION DAY (Yale University Press 2000)
(unpublished manuscript, presented at the Deliberating About Deliberative Democracy
Conference, University of Texas), available at
http://www.la.utexas.edu/conf2ooo/papers/DeliberationDay.pdf. Communications
lawyers inevitably face these questions when debating FCC policy, and election lawyers
confront them in the context of campaign finance reform.
10 See Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65 (1995).
11 See KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS (Cambridge University Press
2004).
12 E.g., Freelance Auction, www.freelanceauction.com (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
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stone in that direction. Part of the problem is that we know too much
about what does not work, but too little about what does. However,
there is a more fundamental problem: before one can talk about the
details of self-governance one must confront the dilemmas of self-
organization. Unless groups are forming there is nothing to (self-)
govern. This paper, therefore, concentrates on the first steps needed
to get from where we are to where one might seek to be: the
encouragement and nurturing of self-organized groups.
Fortunately, the Internet and the cell phone offer a platform for
the deployment of new tools and practices that hold out the hope of
overcoming some of the obstacles that tend to hold back group
formation, and to a lesser extent their endurance, and healthy self-
governance. Unfortunately, self-organization of groups does not
always mean self-governance in any important sense, and the growth
in the variety and number of groups does not necessarily translate into
anything with effects outside those groups. Civil society is a very
broad tent; a book club may be rewarding to its members but it
translates at best imperfectly to any greater form of social action.
Nevertheless, the experience of participation in a type of self-
organizing and self-regulating organization may incubate habits and
practices that could find wider application even if the initial groups
themselves remain insular and inner-directed, that "a multitude of
subspheres of interlocking, cross-pollinating, discourses would
provide an environment in which an informed citizenry could
revitalize the public sphere as a whole."13 In the service of that
objective, many important broader questions of self-governance, such
as how the habits of self-organization are translated into more outer-
directed social movements and practices, are of necessity left to
another day.14
If it is generally agreed that the world, or even part of it, would be
better off with more self-organized groups and self-governing
13 A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@discourse.net: Toward a Critical Theory of
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 871 (2003) (citing John Keane, Structural
Transformations of the Public Sphere, in DIGITAL DEMOCRACY 70, 77-78 (Kenneth L.
Hacker & Jan van Dijk eds., 2ooo)), available at
www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/discourse/ils.pdf.
14 One other limitation deserves mention: this paper addresses civil society enhancement in
terms of primary applicability to relatively wealthy democratic countries. while some of
this discussion may happen to apply elsewhere, this should not be seen to suggest that
these issues claim any priority over other, more basic, problems of elementary public
health, clean water, nutrition, cessation of armed hostilities or even the provision of basic
communications.
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institutions, then it makes sense to explore how we can nurture and
promote them. Paradoxically, it may be that existing institutions can
be harnessed to grow the tools and nurture the conditions that
promote self-organization of groups and democratic decentralized
self-governance. This essay examines the extent to which government
action might promote group formation, and identifies eight specific
governmental policies that could usefully be adopted in any relatively
wealthy liberal democracy to promote the formation of groups and
assist them once they are formed.
II. IF GROUPS ARE GOOD WHY DON'T WE HAVE MORE OF THEM?
"That involvement and participation in groups can have positive
consequences for the individual and the community is a staple notion,
dating back to Durkheim's emphasis on group life as an antidote to
anomie and self-destruction and to Marx's distinction between an
atomized class-in-itself and a mobilized and effective class-for-
itself."L5 Or, as Demos puts it, "The fact that people can pursue
amateur hobbies and interests without state censorship or
interference is a good measure of freedom. People with passions that
draw them into civic life are more likely to have a stake in a
democratic process that defends this freedom of association."16
While many groups-bridge clubs, reading groups-form to serve
private ends, many others, notably political and charitable
organizations, exist to provide goods that benefit non-members.
Group formation is especially important to a healthy political culture.
It has long been recognized that small, spontaneous, citizen-organized
fora,
incorporate[] the republican idea of self-defining or public
good-constituting discourses as one key aspect of politics.
Given pluralism, different self-defining discourses must
occur at both the societal and group level. This implicitly
requires different 'public spheres'- those in principle open to
all and also those open to all who are members of, or who
identify with, smaller, pluralistic groups.' 7
15 Alejandro Portes, Social Capital: Its Origins and Applications in Modern Sociology, 24
ANN. REV. OF SOC. 1, 2 (1998).
16 Demos, supra note 4, at 54.
17 C. Edwin Baker, The Media That Citizens Need, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 317,340 (1998).
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Indeed, a number of economists and sociologists treat various forms
of small group interaction collectively as representing 'social capital."8
Jirgen Habermas has suggested that citizen participation in a
variety of groups is necessary to establish the conditions for legitimate
lawmaking. Membership in groups is an important opportunity for
discursive interaction with others. This encourages citizens to view
life from a variety of perspectives, and to respect each other enough to
engage in honest discourse. This, one hopes, will lead participants to
recognize each other as persons entitled to sufficient basic rights so as
to create the personal autonomy needed to make discourse possible.19
These understandings, Habermas argues, are all prerequisites to
legitimate collective lawmaking, and a society that has these
prerequisites in place makes rules entitled to relative legitimacy, even
if the actual decisions are not the ones that discourse theory would
demand.
In Habermas's view, decentralized and pluralistic decision-making
are also required for the revitalization of the public sphere.
Decentralization counteracts the "generation of mass loyalty" sought
by mass institutions such as political parties and states.20 Subject to
the barrage of nationalist pressure, subgroups must break off to form
smaller discourse communities, either to practice good discourse or to
create the conditions under which some day a coming together of
many parts may produce a suitably discursive whole. The aspiration is
that over time the members of each subgroup will build good
discourse habits in the hothouse of their own distinctive community
where the commonalities of experience and tastes make good
discourse, and perhaps agreement, easier. Once inculcated in the
practices of proper discourse, the participants in these small
communities can venture out and engage in dialogue with others from
different backgrounds who have undergone similar (re)formative
experiences.21
18 See, e.g., Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Social Capital and Community
Governance, 112 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL F419 (2002). The claim that social capital is a
useful concept is far from unanimously accepted. See, e.g., Steven N. Durlauf, On the
Empirics of Social Capital, 112 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL F483 (2002). For a more mixed
view from a sociological perspective, see Portes, supra note 15.
19 See JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 41-42 (Thomas
McCarthy trans., Beacon Press 1984).
20 KENNETH BAYNES, THE NORMATIVE GROUNDs OF SOCIAL CRITICISM: KANT, RAWLS, AND
HABERMAS 179-80 (State University of New York Press 1992).
21 See Habermas, supra note 7, at 165-67.
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That is the hope, but reality tends to be a little messier. Group
membership does not inevitably lead to good discourse. Groups do
not inevitably grow or cross-pollinate. Nor does group membership
inevitably lead to personal growth for their members. Worse, in some
cases, groups may encourage their members' worst tendencies. As
with the KKK and the Nazi Party the fact remains that group
identification may in some cases lead to pathologies.22 Even if groups
are not inherently pathological, otherwise healthy groups may find
themselves twisted by struggles with other similarly situated parties.
It would be foolish to deny the existence of these and other related
social dysfunctions. The question is, which tendencies predominate in
groups, the good or the bad. (The view that democracy functions best
as an aggregation of ordinarily atomistic participants-all men and
women are, or should be, islands-is theoretically possible but has so
little connection to reality that it need not detain us.) One who
believes that when people congregate bad things tend to happen is
likely one who lacks a basic faith in democracy as a social form. The
next step in that chain of reasoning is as likely to be Lenin as Leo
Strauss. For the rest of us, whether we are misty-eyed or realists, a
commitment to democracy as the means to govern ourselves ought to
carry with it a willingness to trust that more often than not, maybe
even much more often than not, when our fellow citizens come
together for some shared purpose at the very least nothing bad will
happen, and that some good things often will.
So, (almost) everyone loves groups. And it's not just connections
within groups that are healthy, but also between them.23 Thus, if there
is any truth to either the "social capital" vision or to the argument that
participation in any form of group activity serves as a sort of
apprenticeship in democracy and discourse, then the output of a self-
organized group can be characterized as a collective good, for we all
benefit from a society in which our fellow citizens are equipped with
the rights and habits that equip them to engage in a Habermasian
discourse as to how we should be governed.
22 For example, identifying oneself as a soccer hooligan might make one more violent.
23 A typical example: "The fact that several groups and organisations were networked
through the Project... appeared to be important for three reasons. First, they did not feel
so isolated and unsupported. Second, learning was reinforced by peers. Third, since these
participants, and particularly the chairs, were often involved in other groups and
organisations, any individual learning had a wider impact." SARABAJAYA KUMAR & KEVIN
NUNAN, A LIGHTER TOUCH 18 (2002), available at
http://www.jrf.org.uk/bookshop/eBooks/184263o954.pdf.
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But if groups are so wonderful, and have all these external
benefits, why do we not have more of them? One very plausible
account of the obstacles to group formation is found in the path-
breaking work of Mancur Olson. 24 Olson's work focused on
identifying the conditions required for groups to form. Olson begins
by theorizing that many groups come into being in order to provide
members with a collective good, and that these collective goods will
often be public goods- that is, goods which, if they are provided, are
non-excludable: one person may not be able to prevent others from
sharing in the benefit once it exists. [A further complicating factor,
one that has taken on increased importance since Olson first wrote in
1965, is that many public goods, notably information goods, are non-
rivalrous, which means that one person's enjoyment of the good does
not increase the cost of another enjoying too.25]
Olson's The Logic of Collective Action 26 distinguishes between
large and small groups, noting that the motivations for self-
organization of groups, and for the endurance of groups, will often
differ substantially depending on the size of the group. Working from
basic micro-economic theory, Olson suggested that, even when it
24 Olson was of course not the first person to attack the problem. Philosophers since at
least de Tocqueville (if not Aristotle, who famously remarked that man is by nature a
political animal) have remarked on what they considered to be man's natural tendency to
form groups.
Twentieth-century interest-group theorists suggest that a primary motivation for the
formation of large groups is a desire to influence political, and especially electoral,
outcomes. The positive theory of pluralism assumes factions are a fact of political life,
views power as dispersed, and, therefore, sees conflict as inevitable. The normative theory
views this as a largely desirable state of affairs, because different groups are able to bargain
for what they most desire and because tyranny is less likely, and concludes that the
government's role is to regulate the bargaining among interest groups. Thus, for some, the
political arena is best understood as a sort of marketplace- variously a marketplace of
ideas, a market for influence, or simply a market for votes. From this somewhat common
positive base, however, comes an even greater variety of normative visions. Certain
theorists understand the competition between groups to be the democratic system at its
finest; others decry the triumph of faction and to create, or return to, a small-R republican
vision of governance in which deliberation would play a greater role and the naked
competition for influence or resources would be subordinated to reason.
25 Cf Brad DeLong & A. Michael Froomkin, Speculative Microeconomicsfor Tomorrow's
Economy, in INTERNET PUBLISHING AND BEYOND: THE ECONOMICS OF DIGITAL
INFORMATION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 6 (Brian Kahin & Hal Varian eds., MIT Press
2000), available at www.law.miami.edu/-froomkin/articles/spec.htm.
26 MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (Oxford University Press 2d ed. 1971).
Hereinafter "LOGIC."
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would be economically efficient for them to do so, large groups will
tend not to form to produce collective goods because it is too easy for
individual members to shirk their contributions and yet benefit from
the community's provision of the non-excludable public good. As for
small groups, even when they do form, theory suggests that they will
tend to produce less than the socially optimal amount of the collective
good. Thus, for both large and small groups, in theory:
The necessary conditions for the optimal provision of a
collective good, through the voluntary and independent
action of the members of a group, can, however, be stated
very simply. The marginal cost of additional units of the
collective good must be shared in exactly the same
proportion as the additional benefits. Only if this is done
will each member find that his own marginal costs and
benefits are equal at the same time that the total marginal
cost equals the total or aggregate marginal benefit. If
marginal costs are shared in any other way, the amount of
collective good provided will be suboptimal. It might seem
at first glance that if some cost allocations lead to a
suboptimal provision of a collective good, then some other
cost allocations would lead to a supraoptimal supply of that
good; but this is not so. In any group in which participation
is voluntary, the member or members whose shares of the
marginal cost exceed their shares of the additional benefits
will stop contributing to the achievement of the collective
good before the group optimum has been reached. And there
is no conceivable cost-sharing arrangement in which some
member does not have a marginal cost greater than his share
of the marginal benefit, except the one in which every
member of the group shares marginal costs in exactly the
same proportion in which he shares incremental benefits.27
Even when the would-be participants can identify each other,
belonging takes effort, and the material benefits are diffuse. Worse,
"the larger the group, the farther it will fall short of proving an optimal
amount of a collective good."2 This effect is particularly severe if all
27 LOGIC, supra note 26, at 30-31 (footnotes omitted).
28 Id. at 35.
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members of the group have an approximately equal interest in the
production of the collective good.29
Important and fundamental as Olson's rule about non-optimal
group formation remains, it is essential to note its limitations. First,
this principle applies only to group formation "through the voluntary
and independent action of the members of a group." In other words,
Olson's rule describes a problem which can be overcome by outside
action, such as action by government; the rule does not say that
solutions capable of changing the incentive structure are doomed to
fail. Indeed much of Olson's work consisted of explaining features of
various social institutions, such as labor unions, as originating from a
need to provide attractive services to members that were not
collective, but just ordinary goods.
Second, as Olson himself admits in The Logic of Collective Action,
the behavior of small groups remains very sensitive to the group's
institutional arrangements, to the point that the general rule might
not always apply. 30 In small groups, relationships matter, but
traditionally large groups are less driven by personal relationships-
although that does not mean that personal feelings are irrelevant.3,
Indeed, smaller groups are more effective at "action taking" while
larger groups are better for seeking a diversity of views.32 Even in a
small group, however, where the possibility of consensus is the
greatest, there remains the constant danger that agreement will not
translate into action, since most participants have an incentive to
shirk in the hopes that others will do the work or bear the costs.33
Small, action-oriented, groups can overcome this tendency with forms
of social commitment, but that works progressively less as the group
grows, unless it can break itself into component cells. (Consider, for
example, religious congregations, which are small enough to police
their memberships but may be part of a national or international
denomination.)
29 Id.
30 Id. at 30. There is also the somewhat special case of a group in which one member of the
group gains a disproportionate benefit. This situation makes it very likely that the group
will form, but does not change Olson's conclusion that the group will still produce a socially
suboptimal quantity of the public good.
31 C. the third part of ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (Harvard
University Press 1970).
32 LOGIC, supra note 26, at 56.
33 Id. at 33-35, 42.
2009]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
Groups also fail to form because there are cost barriers to self-
organization. Surmounting the cost barrier is made more difficult by
the incentives of group members to avoid the costs of joining the
group (and to shirk from bearing the costs of production once they are
in it), especially if the good being produced is non-excludable. In the
familiar34 tragedy of the commons, rational economic actors hope
someone else will do the work. New technologies, discussed below,
greatly reduce the cost of group formation. In so doing, they greatly
blunt the cost obstacle to group formation, both by reducing search
time for like-minded participants and, in the case of virtual groups, by
reducing the actual cost of meeting.
Large groups, unless organized around the personality of a
charismatic leader, tend to be less affected by the vagaries of
personality. But the lack of the personal element also means that
there is less to mitigate the negative incentive effects described by
Mancur Olson. Groups respond to these challenges with a variety of
strategies. One, described by Olson, is to attempt to provide
excludable goods to members; the classic examples include insurance
or pension schemes for union members. Another strategy is to
federate, to try to achieve the personal relationships that drive small
groups by having the big organization made up of myriad small
chapters. Unfortunately, this tends to spawn a bureaucracy that at
best mediates between local needs and national (or international)
objectives, but more commonly becomes subject to Michel's iron law
of oligarchy.35
In contrast to the rich amount of theory and evidence about the
mechanics of group formation, useful generalizations about the
mechanics of self-governance of small groups seem surprisingly hard
to come by. There are, of course, exceptions to this generalization, but
the well-studied practices appear in particular formalized contexts
that raise doubt about their general applicability, and especially their
applicability to less formal contexts. For example, there is extensive
literature about how to pick and organize corporate boards, which are
certainly small groups. It's not at all obvious, however, how this work
translates to less formal contexts where there is no corporate charter
34 Familiar, but perhaps somewhat over-sold? For an argument that empirical evidence for
over-grazing of commons land is in fact rather scant to non-existent, see Ian Angus,
Debunking the 'Tragedy of the Commons,' INT'L J. OF SOCIALIST RENEWAL, Aug. 24, 2008,
http://links.org.au/node/595.
35 ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES 15 (Eden Paul & Cedar Paul trans., The Free Press
1962) (arguing that "oligarchy... is an intrinsic part of bureaucracy or large-scale
organization").
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and, indeed, sometimes no written agreement setting out the
organization's formal structure. Even clubs with rules will often tend
to have a lighter organization, perhaps one with a leader or two. Nor
is it evident that these bodies should be encouraged to adopt
corporate-style formalities or that they would benefit if they did.
The management problem is even more acute in the virtual
context where, due to the newness of the medium, there are fewer
existing traditions and folkways to rely on. Mailing lists are perhaps
the most venerable Internet-based technology for self-organization of
groups, but even here there are, as yet, few models of how a group can
organize itself. I can testify from personal experience that mailing
lists can engender a sense of community. But, it's a fragile community
and can easily fall apart when there are disputes. For example,
mailing lists sometimes fall prey to "flame wars" or find that their
community is being distracted by procedural wrangles, most often
over what ground rules should govern posting rights to the list. Basic
mailing list software is often configured so that one person, the
'owner' of the list, can control who can join it and who can post to it, a
practice often called "moderating." Social expectations are not yet
widely shared as to how that potentially dictatorial power should be
used or shared; if anything, the libertarian tendencies of many
internet pioneers (combined with the availability of free mailing list
software) has bred an attitude that if people don't like the way this list
is run, they should go off and found their own. The result is that lists
are vulnerable to schism and often seem to have a fixed life cycle.36
36 There is enormous truth to this famous internet post describing the "natural life cycle of
mailing lists":
i. Initial enthusiasm (people introduce themselves, and gush a lot about how
wonderful it is to find kindred souls).
2. Evangelism (people moan about how few folks are posting to the list, and
brainstorm recruitment strategies).
3. Growth (more and more people join, more and more lengthy threads develop,
occasional off-topic threads pop up).
4. Community (lots of threads, some more relevant than others; lots of information
and advice is exchanged; experts help other experts as well as less experienced
colleagues; friendships develop; people tease each other; newcomers are welcomed
with generosity and patience; everyone-newbie and expert alike-feels comfortable
asking questions, suggesting answers, and sharing opinions).
5. Discomfort with diversity (the number of messages increases dramatically; not
every thread is fascinating to every reader; people start complaining about the signal-
to-noise ratio; person 1 threatens to quit if other people don't limit discussion to
person i's pet topic; person 2 agrees with person i; person 3 tells 1 & 2 to lighten up;
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The mailing list governance problem is symptomatic of a more
general problem that is found both on and off-line: small groups don't
have good governance structures. As one British study of small group
governance put it:
Unsuitable legal frameworks and poor constitutions were a
root cause of many governance problems. An off-the-shelf
constitution may be inadequately understood, while effort
expended on a tailor-made document may divert the
organisation from its purpose. In many cases, an ideal
constitution might be unattainable because of the absence of
a suitable legal framework.3
7
What is needed is models and advice that respond to the actual needs
of a very heterogeneous set of groups of varying size, purpose, and
diversity. And that's not easy.
III. ENHANCING GROUPS WITH SOCIAL SOFTWARE
Before making any case for government intervention, one should
understand the important-but still limited-ways in which recent
technological innovation and the ordinary workings of the markets for
software and attention contribute to group formation. The Internet,
and software that relies on it, make it easier for both physical and
more bandwidth is wasted complaining about off-topic threads than is used for the
threads themselves; everyone gets annoyed).
6a. Smug complacency and stagnation (the purists flame everyone who asks an 'old'
question or responds with humor to a serious post; newbies are rebuffed; traffic drops
to a doze-producing level of a few minor issues; all interesting discussions happen by
private email and are limited to a few participants; the purists spend lots of time self-
righteously congratulating each other on keeping off-topic threads off the list).
OR
6b. Maturity (a few people quit in a huff; the rest of the participants stay near stage 4,
with stage 5 popping up briefly every few weeks; many people wear out their second or
third 'delete' key, but the list lives contentedly ever after).
Michael Forster, The Natural Life Cycle of Mailing Lists, http://oii.org/lists/lifecycle.html
(last visited Jan. 25, 2009).
37 SARABAJAYA KUMAR & KEVIN NUNAN, STRENGTHENING GOVERNANCE OF SMALL
COMMUNITY AND VOLUNTARY ORGANISATIONS (2002),
http://www.jrf.org.uk/knowledge/findings/socialpolicy/o52.asp (last visited Jan 21,
2009).
[Vol. 5:1
virtual groups to form, and provide new tools to assist them in
managing their own affairs. So-called 'social software,' such as
Facebook, MySpace, Meetup and others, makes it possible for
potential group members to find each other both online and offline.
Mailing lists and more sophisticated tools that have community-run
filtering make asynchronous conversations easy, even among very
large groups. Although the talking tools are many and increasingly
robust, the doing tools (other than those that bring people together in
the first place) remain conspicuously underdeveloped, especially for
any but the smallest groups.
These developments are occurring without government
intervention, but as we will see there remains scope for government to
nurture them and especially to facilitate solutions to specific problems
that participants have not as yet been able to solve themselves. Even
more importantly, however, the government's role should first be to
do no harm.38 Modesty is called for, in part because we know so little
about what works. 39 Thus, whenever possible, government
interventions need to be facilitative, not constraining.40
If the problem of access to the network can be overcome,41 "social
software" opens up a world of possibilities for people seeking to
interact with their neighbors- and with people far away. "Social
software" has been defined as encompassing "all uses of software that
supported interacting groups, even if the interaction was offline."42
Alternately, "[s]ocial [s]oftware can be loosely defined as software
which supports, extends, or derives added value from, human social
38 Cf. Demos, supra note 4, at 57 ("The main goal of public policy should be relatively
modest: to avoid policy interventions that might stifle the growth in Pro-Am activity.
Powerful social and economic trends are likely to promote Pro-Am culture, without
government intervention.").
39 "Despite the rhetoric of 'building social capital,' the government knows remarkably little
about which policies help to generate social ties." Demos, supra note 4, at 58.
40 See Kumar & Nunan, supra note 23, at 20.
41 On the access question, see infra text at- Section IV(i) (discussing need to improve
communications infrastructure).
42 See Christopher Allen, Life with Alacrity,
http://www.lifewithalacrity.com/2oo4/lo/tracing_theevo.htm (Oct. 13, 2004, 23:40
EST) (quoting Clay Shirky).
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behavior- message-boards, musical taste-sharing, photo-sharing,
instant messaging, mailing lists, social networking."43
Social software vastly reduces the cost of group formation in two
ways: It nearly eliminates search costs for like-minded people to find
one another, and-if the group is virtual rather than organized around
physical meetings-social software greatly lowers the cost of
participation. For those whose lives are too full to make the meeting,
and for groups that are geographically diffuse, the Internet offers a
plethora of asynchronous discussion fora ranging from mailing lists to
chat rooms to community-moderated fora. Indeed, in places where
there is free government-sponsored internet access, or where access is
offered under 'all you can eat' plans common for DSL, the marginal
cost of participation in virtual communities is only the opportunity
cost of not doing something else.
A. MEETING TOOLS
One of the major barriers to group formation is finding other
people who share your interests. Internet tools not only expand the
universe of possible interlocutors, they make finding them much
easier. People with unusual or specialized interests may be the only
one in their respective areas, but can join online virtual communities.
People with a more popular interest can quickly find information
about meeting locations in their area; if none exists they can organize
one. Thus, the Internet greatly lowers the fixed costs of group
formation, eliminating, or at least greatly ameliorating, one of the
factors that Mancur Olson noted inhibits group creation.
The Internet's ability to facilitate traditional formation of affinity
groups, clubs, and traditional in-person organizing should not be
underestimated. Group formation tools such as meetup.com44
43 Tom Coates, An addendum to a definition of Social Software,
http://www.plasticbag.org/archives/2005/oi/an addendum to a definition of social_
software.shtml (Jan. 5, 2005, 12:o6 EST); see also Tom Coates, My Working Definition of
Social Software,
http://www.plasticbag.org/archives/2003/o5/my-worldng-definition-of-soialsoftwar
e.shtml (May 8, 2003, 12:34 EST).
44 Meetup, http://www.meetup.com. An example of a more social, less politically oriented
site is www.friendster.com. Friendster had 975,0oo unique visitors in the entire month of
March, 2005. "11.3 million users visited MySpace that month, and 4.1 million people
visited Thefacebook." Gary Rivlin, Skeptics Take Another Look at Social Sites, N.Y.
TIMES, May 9, 2005, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/o9/technology/o9network.html?pagewanted=2&ei=5
o9o&en=7ald7b2855a83edf&ex= 12732912oo&partner=rssuserland&emc=rss. By 2008,
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provide an easy matching service for like-minded people in a physical
community to get together in person as well as online. Anyone can
propose a topic for a meeting and a general area (e.g. Miami-Dade
County). The Meetup service then advertises the existence of the
proposed groups, collects interested parties, brokers a poll of possible
meeting locations, announces the result, and then reminds everyone
who has expressed interest to come. Other services, such as
friendster.com and many dating sites, promote social contacts.
Although it has been suggested that time spent online might
detract from time spent in face to face interactions with others,
research fails to support this claim.45 Indeed, "[r]esearch evidence on
middle class or wealthier neighborhoods suggests a virtuous circle
between [Information and Communication Technology (ICT)] use and
more traditional neighborly relations," 46 thus validating the
Facebook had about six million visitors per day, while MySpace's daily tally ran about
eight million. See Google Trends,
http://trends.google.com/websites?q=facebook.com%2C+myspace.com&geo=US&date=al
l&sort=o (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
45 Another popular hypothesis is that Internet usage comes at the expense of TV viewing,
see, e.g., NORMAN H. NIE & LUTZ ERBRING, INTERNET AND SOCIETY A PRELIMINARY
REPORT, STANDFORD INSTITUTE FOR THE QUANTITATWVE STUDY OF SOCIETY (2000),
http://www.stanford.edu/group/siqss/Press -Release/Preliminary-Report.pdf; Waipeng
Lee & Eddie C. Y. Kuo Internet and Displacement Effect: Children's Media Use and
Activities in Singapore, J. OF COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 1 (2002), available at
http://unpani.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documnents/APC1TY/UNPANo1363 4 .pdf;
Press Release, IBM, IBM Consumer Survey Shows Decline of TV as Primary Media Device
(Aug. 22, 20o7), available at http://www-
o3.ibm.com/press/us/en/pressrelease/222o6.wss; but see David Goetzl, M Census: TV
Consumption Is Up, MEDIA DAILY NEWS, May 30, 2008,
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/index.cfm?fuseaction=tAricles.san&s=8 3 68o&N
id=43281&p= 3 68626; New Online TVServices Helping to Expand TV Viewing 7me,
THINKBOX, Aug. 12,2OO8, http://www.thinkbox.tv/server/show/ConWebDoc.1 33 1.
However, new research suggests that internet consumption has not had a negative effect on
TV viewing, and that Americans actually watch more TV than ever before- 127 hours and
15 minutes of TV per month per person, five an half hours more than in 2007. Meanwhile,
the average time on the Internet grew nine percent, to 26 hours and 26 minutes a month.
Nick Mokey, Nielsen: Internet Hasn't Hurt TV Viewing, DIGITAL TRENDS, July 8,2OO8,
http://news.digitaltrends.com/news-article/17216/nielsen-internet-hasn-t-hurt-tV-
viewing.
New technology that allows time-shifting, such as DVR and online videos, may explain the
increase. Nick Moke, DVRs Boost TV Watching, DIGITAL TRENDS, Feb. 15, 2008,
http://news.digitaltrends.com/news-article/15755/dvrs-boost-tv-watching.
46 GARY BRIDGE & SUSANNA GIULLARI, E-NEIGHBOURHOODS 31 (2004),
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/sps/enrpapersword/cnr2 5 pap.doc.
2009]
I/S: A JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
hypothesis that "social capital and civic engagement will increase
when virtual communities develop around physically based
communities and when these virtual communities foster additional
communities of interest."47 As a Canadian study put it:
We find that people's interaction online supplements their
face-to-face and telephone communication, without
increasing or decreasing it. However, Internet use is
associated with increased participation in voluntary
organizations and politics. Further support for this effect is
the positive association between offline and online
participation in voluntary organizations and politics.
Internet use is associated with a sense of online community,
in general and with kin. Taken together, the evidence
suggests that the Internet is becoming normalized as it is
incorporated into the routine practices of everyday life.48
Until recently, the cost of online search for those with access to the
Internet has been equal to the cost of connection time. Meetup, for
example, started as free, but then switched to a pay model in which it
charged group organizers a monthly fee of $1o-$2o.49 If Meetup were
the only site of its kind rather than just the best known in the U.S.,
then this pricing decision would provide a historic test of the elasticity
of the barriers to group formation described by Mancur Olson.
Unfortunately for economists, but fortunately for those seeking to
form organizations online, there are other similar services that
currently operate at no charge. 50 Even without the benefit of a
controlled test, however, anecdotal evidence and personal experience
47 ANITA BLANCHARD & TOM HORAN, VIRTUAL COMMUNITIES AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 5 (Ideas
Group Publishing 2000).
48 BARRY WELLMAN ET AL., DOES THE INTERNET INCREASE, DECREASE, OR SUPPLEMENT
SoCIAL CAPITAL? SOCIAL NETWORKS, PARTICIPATION, AND COMMUNITY COMMITMENT (2001),
available at http://www.chass.utoronto.ca/-wellman/publications/netadd/hungarian-
article2.PDF.
49 See Meetup.com,
http://web.archive.org/web/20080120191653/http://www.meetup.com/changes (last
visited Jan. 21, 2009).
50 See Cliff Allen, Meetup Meets the Replacements, ALLEN.COM,
http://www.allen.com/cgi-bin/gt/tpl.h,content=122 (last visited Jan. 21, 2009)
(comparing Evite and SureToMeet).
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make it clear that when Meetup moved to a pay model, many users
lost their enthusiasm for it.51
B. TALKING TOOLS
Blogs, one of the newer types of online talking tools, seem to be
creating new epistolary communities as bloggers debate each other
and as readers deposit their comments and annotations.52 The result
is a great flowering of discourse, a sharing of expertise, a sphere of
shared interests, rather than shared geography. The spate of blogs
devoted to specialized legal topics is an excellent example of this
phenomenon. It makes expert commentary available to a mass
audience. While there is not much evidence that the mass audience
cares directly, these blogs seem to influence traditional mediating
institutions such as the established press, and thus influence a mass
audience at one remove. One important exception is the Daily Kos
site, which is more than a blog; by inviting users to create their own
"diaries" (mini-blogs) within the site, and inviting readers to comment
on each others' diaries, the site has turned itself into a true virtual
community. The medium is still evolving rapidly.
Social software is perhaps best known for its creation of virtual
communities. The tools range from mailing lists and bulletin boards
to sophisticated community-governed discussion spaces. On the
Internet, talk (in any quantity) is cheap. The challenge is to help
people find the talk they want, and to help them structure their
communicative institutions to enable valuable and productive
discourses. One special problem is how to avoid discursive sabotage,
without descending into any form of public or private censorship.
What counts as discursive sabotage depends on the circumstances.
Often, it is simply unsolicited commercial messages- spam. What in
one case might be acceptable vitriol will be flaming or silencing in
another.
The best social software tries to create virtuous circles-
mechanisms that promote positive behaviors. Community discussion
51 E.g., Posting of Dave Taylor to The Business Blog at Intuitive.com, Change your business
model and kill your business? Meetup.com,
http://www.intuitive.com/blog/change-your-business-model and-kll-your-business
meetupcom.html (Apr. 14, 2005,14:56 EST) ("When your business is a commodity service,
how do you survive the transition from free to paid without sweetening the transaction?
The answer: You don't.").
52 See Froomkin, supra note 13, at 859-60.
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tools such as Slash, PHP-Nuke, Scoop, Squishdot, and Zope enable the
creation of virtual communities in which participants' interactions are
structured to encourage speech that the community finds valuable
without actual censorship.53 These tools allow largely unfettered and
almost unlimited discussion while enabling participants to prioritize
their reading- for example, by limiting themselves to contributions
that other members of the community have deemed as worth reading.
Anyone can suggest a topic of discussion. In some implementations, a
group of editors each have the ability to approve the creation of a new
discussion topic, usually one suggested by a reader.54 In others, the
community itself decides what it most wants to talk about.55 Slash
software running at the Slashdot.org site manages a community of
well over half a million participants. Zope software at DailyKos also
supports a community measured in hundreds of thousands.
Software-based discourse systems help create virtuous circles of
discourse in which the community majority serves simultaneously as
author, cheerleader, scolder, and reader. To people invested in the
issues or the community, the participation can resonate on several
levels. Receiving a positive rating, a visible sign of community
approval, serves as a reward for participation, and thus further helps
overcome the collective action problem. Participation as a moderator
democratizes the governance of the community. Meta-moderation
simultaneously democratizes governance and provides feedback to
moderators. By taking on each of these roles members of the
community are at once jointly governing and educating each other,
engaging in something that sounds suspiciously like the role
communication is supposed to play in civic republican theories of the
formation of civic virtue.
An important aspect of this self-reinforcing (dare one say,
reflexive) process is that it is the community itself, and not some
would-be Platonic guardian or even a Federalist elite,56 that defines
what constitutes praiseworthy discourse. The risks are obvious and
inherent to democracy: if the community is depraved, its communal
53 Id. at 863-67.
54Id.
55 At Kuro5hin.org, every article submitted for publication goes into a special "moderation
queue," where members each get one vote to determine whether it should be promoted to
the homepage.
56 Cf Federalist No. 57 (rulers should be those who possess the most wisdom and the most
virtue).
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choices may be evil.57 If the community is divided into sharply
disagreeing camps, it may be fissiparous rather than Fissian. Tools
that structure discourse can only do so much- they are only tools, and
while over time they can create solidarity, even empower a
community, and help it educate itself, this cannot happen overnight
and no tool can re-make a community. At best the right tools can
accentuate and propagate positive tendencies, and discourage
negative ones, but tools, like democracy, can only work when they
have something to begin with.58
Less progress has been made in breaking vicious circles then there
has been in creating conditions that tend to prevent their formation in
the first place. More elaborate types of software encode mechanisms
to regulate posting rights or to enlist the community in collectively
tagging the gold and ignoring the dross. But, once any sort of group
gets caught up in a procedural war (at least in my personal
experience) it is very hard to get it back to where it was before the
wrangles erupted.
A "wiki" is a special type of collaborative talking tool that allows
many people to collaborate on the production of linked documents.
"A defining characteristic of wiki technology is the ease with which
pages can be created and updated. Generally, there is no review
before modifications are accepted, and most wikis are open to the
general public- or at least anyone who has access to the wild server.
In fact, even registration of a user account is not always required."59
Wilds are very vulnerable to sabotage, and rely either on escaping
notice or on having a critical mass of committed participants who scan
all new changes and 'roll back' those seen as destructive. This works-
up to a point. The cheerful version of the story is the Wikipedia's own
account of itself:
A common defense against persistent 'vandals' is to simply
let them deface as many pages as they wish, knowing that
they can easily be tracked and reverted after the vandal has
left. This policy can quickly become impractical, however,
57 Unless of course the community is made up of depraved hypocrites, which could lead to
interesting results.
58 Cf. James Madison, Remarks to the Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788).
59 See JOSEPH REAGLE, IN GOOD FAITH: WIIPEDIA COLLABORATIONAND THE PURSUIT OF
THE UN vERSAL ENCYCLOPEDIA (2008) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, New York
University), available at http://reagle.org/joseph/2oo8/o3/dsrtn-in-good.faith.
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in the face of systematic defacements born out of anger or
frustration.
As an emergency measure, some wikis allow the database to
be switched to read-only mode, while others enforce a policy
in which only established users who have registered prior to
some arbitrary cutoff date can continue editing. Generally
speaking, however, any damage that is inflicted by a
'vandal' can be reverted quickly and easily. More
problematic are subtle errors inserted into pages which go
undetected, for example changing of album release dates and
discographies.60
Some Wild users argue that because it takes time to create Wild
content, plus the relative ease with which it can be replaced, the Wild
medium actually welcomes and encourages deliberation- and
discourages name-calling and tantrums, since these comments get
deleted quickly.61 In this vision, self-policing is an ongoing process,
one in which the vandals are being held at bay and in which discursive
values are being promoted. There is also, however, a darker account,
in which Wikipedia is prey to substantial internecine strife. For
example, the editing of the biographical content of living persons
created recent conflict and controversy within the Wikipedia
community when people began to notice and edit their own
biographies. 62 Wikipedians ultimately settled the dispute by taking
the matter to their own Arbitration Committee. 63
60 Wikipedia: Wild,
http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php.ltle=Special:Cite&page=Wilddd=7578182 (last
visited Jan. 21, 2009).
61 See Reagle, supra note 59, at 112-36 for a particularly warm, yet careful, account of
Wikipedean discourse virtues.
62 See Andrea Forte & Amy Bruclunan, Scaling Consensus: Increasing Decentralization in
Wikipedia Governance, (Jan. 20o8) (unpublished paper presented at the Hawaii
International Conference on Systems Sciences), available at
http://www.cc.gatech.edu/-aforte/ForteBruckmanScalingConsensus.pdf (discussing how
the growth of the Wildpedia community has resulted in increasing decentralization of the
final stages of dispute resolution and use of severe sanctions). Also, Wildpedia co-founder
Jimmy Wales allegedly ordered changes to the biography of his then girlfriend in violation
of the asserted principle that Wikipedia is a neutral encyclopedia in which articles are not
to be edited by those with a personal interest. See Cade Metz, Jimbo Wales Dumps Lover
on Wikipedia, THE REGISTER, Mar. 3,2oo8,
http://www.theregister.co.uk/2oo8/o3/o3/imbowale_rachelmarsden.
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C. TURNING TALKING TOOLS INTO DOING TOOLS
A few years ago, New York City Community Board member
Thomas Lowenhaupt created the BeyondVoting Wiki64 in order to
provide what he calls "a place where people can gather to speculate on
ways we might use the internet to improve our city."65 Lowenhaupt
described the goals of his project as to "empower individuals,
community organizations, and community boards" whom he
challenged to "ponder, research, discuss, and propose a new
governance structure for New York City."66 But these discussions,
while they might inform Lowenhaupt's actions, or even that of other
politicians, will not generate outcomes directly.
If the Internet excels at providing talking tools, its record at
providing doing tools is more mixed. For smaller groups, Benjamin R.
Barber and Beth Simone Noveck's "Unchat" program offers novel
ways to structure small-group real-time online discussions by building
in means for participants to choose (and un-choose) discussion
leaders and moderators, to set many of their own ground rules, and to
have private side-conversations about procedure that need not disrupt
the discussion of substance. To encourage decision-making, the
Other recent disputes include a philosophical struggle between those who welcome articles
on almost any subject versus those who would prefer an editorial policy that banned
articles on trivial subjects in the hopes of enhancing the Wikipedia's credibility. See The
Battle for Wikipedia's Soul, ECONOMIST.COM, Mar. 6,2008,
http://www.economist.com/science/tq/displaystory.cfm?story-id=10789354.
63 According to Forte & Bruckman, supra note 62:
The Arbitration Committee wields considerable influence in the community. The
Arbitration Committee (Arb Corn) was conceived of as the last step in a formal
dispute resolution process put into place in early 2004; however, today it appears
to often serve as a more general decision-making body for the English language
site.... Committee members are selected through a hybrid process of election by
the community and appointment by Jimmy Wales. Arbitrators have no special
authority with respect to content or any formal power to create policy, yet we will
see that Committee action can play a role in influencing both policy and content.
Id. at 4.
64 Beyond Voting, http://beyondvoting.wikicities.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
65 Tom Lowenhaupt, BeyondVoting Wild, http://cic.si.umich.edu/node/2 7 6 (last visited
Jan. 21, 2009).
66 Letter from Tom Lowenhaupt, http://beyondvoting.wikia.com/wiki/Letter (last visited
Jan. 21, 2009).
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software includes a module for straw polls of the group. To encourage
good decisions, Unchat provides for easy integrated linking to outside
sources of information. Unfortunately, in its current form the
program works only for small groups of up to fifty or so.
Proposals exist to allow citizens direct input into municipal
decisions. A city might, for example, give every taxpayer a fixed
number of electronic ballots per year that could be 'spent' on a web-
based map. When a pothole accreted enough votes, a crew could be
dispatched to fix it. Or, citizens could put questions to city
bureaucrats who would have an obligation to reply to them on a public
web site. Both these proposals, and others like them, require an
ability to securely identify an online participant as being the person
they claim to be. The lack of a secure and widely deployed public key
infrastructure or equivalent means of securely authenticating
identities has slowed the deployment of applications that rely on
counting votes or otherwise weighing public opinion as an element of
government decision-making. The costs of deployment and the
possibly pernicious effect on personal privacy, means Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) systems may be long in coming. In the
meantime, many municipalities and government organizations invite
citizen input online,67 but this is far from giving citizens real direct
control.
At present, therefore, the most significant impact from social
software on decision-making and self-governance is probably the
facilitation of in-person meetings.68 "Meetup does the hardest work of
modern collective action problem-solving for you- it finds the location
for you, sets the date, and requires no initial contact with a leader.
What we learned on the Dean campaign is that simply bringing 10 to
30 people together in a room with a shared purpose, leaders would
67 See, e.g., Cape Coral Florida, Citizen's Input Form,
http://www.capecoral.net/Government/MayorandCouncil/CitizensInputForm/tabid/483/
Default.aspx (last visited Jan. 21, 2009); Town of Frisco, Colorado, Frisco launches online
program to gather citizen input,
http://www.townoffrisco.com/news/story.html?id=2339&title=FriscO%2olaunches%2Oon
line%2oprogram%2oto%2ogather%2ocitizen%2oinput&date=6/15/2007%2o12:o6:1o%2
oPM; Kate Bucklin, City creates online toolfor easier citizen input, THE FORECASTER, Sept.
11, 2008, http://www.theforecaster.net/story.php?storyid=16113 (describing Portland's
new "Constituent Tracking System" designed to residents with complaints, suggestions, or
comments to communicate with city government via web forms).
68 Internet fund raising and voter organization are increasingly important phenomena, but
to date have been organized in a traditional top down fashion run by a central campaign
organization.
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emerge." 69 Even here, however, the groups that form are small and
local. No good tool yet exists to help these grow or even to federate
groups on a national scale without a substantial amount of human
intervention. The 2004 Dean for President campaign learned this
lesson too, to its detriment.70
V. SOLUTIONS FROM THE Top: How GOVERNMENT CAN HELP
In a perfect world, self-organization of groups would be a
spontaneous bottom up phenomenon, one that required no central
assistance. There is indeed something ironic, even illogical, about
wanting large national institutions71 to act to stimulate bottom up
group formation. It may be even more unreasonable to expect top
down control institutions such as governments to nurture self-
governing institutions that may in time grow to become rival power
centers. Economics, and economists, teach us that we live in a world
that is far from perfect. Citizens in liberal democracies traditionally
look to their governments to serve ameliorative functions. Other
institutions, such as churches, charities and other NGOs, also play
important roles in fixing market failure and failures caused by the
markets. Thus, despite the irony, it seems plausible to ask what
governments and other large established institutions can do to induce
more groups to form and to help them engage in workable self-
governance. The Internet makes this challenge more interesting, and
perhaps more feasible, because it presents a plethora of new
opportunities for self-organization of groups and deliberation.
Governments should seize the opportunity.
But how? Demos's report recommended targeted subsidies:
The government should launch a... fellowship programme,
investing small sums in community [leaders]. This might be
modelled on localised versions of the National Endowment
for Science Technology and the Arts, which provide
69 Zephyr Teachout, Come Together Right Now: The Internet's Unlit Fuse, PERSONAL
DEMOCRACY FORUM, Nov. 17, 2004, http://personaldemocracy.com/node/152.
70 Id.
71 Or, in the case of the EU, supra-national institutions.
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fellowships for innovators, and be funded by the Big Lottery
Fund.72
Demos proposed this not only to encourage and reward group
formation, but because it believed that encouraging Pro-Ams is good
for the economy.73
Direct subsidies may make sense as a stimulant to the production
of industrial capital by infant industries, but it is a bad policy as
regards the production of social capital.74 Although self-organized
groups are not necessarily political, some will be; others may in time
take on a political tinge as the members find themselves already
organized should they become politicized. Still other groups may
never be overtly political, but may nonetheless have political side-
effects by their very existence as training grounds in communal
relations. Given these roles, it is unwise to encourage governments to
pick winners and create losers. Doing so invites governments into
considering the content of projects. In the U.S. at least, it is now
widely agreed that this is not an appropriate role for government- a
sea change from thirty years ago when the question was hotly
debated.75
Today far fewer in the U.S. argue for active government
intervention to promote diverse speech-much less for some
72 Demos, supra note 4, at 58.
73 No government has yet designed a policy to support open source models of technology
development. Most major Pro-Am and open source developments-such as Linux and
Apache software-have come from informal groups of Pro-Ams banding together, often
based around a university, such as Berkeley near San Francisco. Open source initiatives
such as Linux provide a vital alternative to an incumbent proprietary supplier such as
Microsoft. An innovation policy to deliberately fund open source communities as
competitors to incumbents would look quite different from one modeled on the Silicon
Valley venture capital approach to exploiting intellectual capital. Demos, supra note 4, at
65.
74 Note that the claim in the text is limited to subsidies for group formation and related
types of social capital. It does not imply a view about subsidies to support the production
of other forms of cultural capital, such as the arts and sciences.
75 In the 197os when Red Lion still seemed like good law, and even until the Fairness
Doctrine expired in the 198os, the idea that the government should actively regulate to
ensure better discourse (for example, by ensuring a diversity of viewpoints in scarcity
media) had many adherents. E.g., Owen M. Fiss, Why the State?, oo HARv. L. REV. 781,
792 (1987); Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IOWA L. REV. 1405, 1416
(1986) (arguing that government intervention is needed "to safeguard the conditions for
true and free collective self-determination").
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intervention in favor of any particular concept of quality speech-both
because what constitutes good speech is contested and because no
branch of government seems at all interested in pursuing the idea.
Indeed, today arguably all three branches of government are actively
hostile to the idea of active intervention to promote diversity in
speech. The government retains a regulatory role in some areas, such
as the public forum doctrine, but it remains unclear to what extent any
of these doctrines translate neatly to computer-mediated
communications76 or even remain relevant in an era of private malls
and security-conscious public spaces. Similarly, although state and
local governments could play an enormous role in the creation of good
habits of discourse via their ability to influence curriculum in state
schools,77 the chances of this seem remote at best.
As Clay Shirky says, "Social Software encodes political bargains."78
Software helps make difficult things easy, but too often at the cost of
defining roles. Thus, for the same sorts of reasons that it would be
undesirable for governments to subsidize some community leaders, it
would be preferable if governments did not try to pick a narrow group
of winners among the types of software that structure conversations or
helped groups reach decisions or govern themselves. Given the
diversity of organizations and objectives, software that defines a
"chair" or a "board" or even "moderators" would be a Procrustean
solution for too many groups.
The government's role should be facilitative yet entirely content-
neutral. Even ostensibly non-political rules such as one that limited
subsidies to non-political activities should be avoided. Human time
and energy is limited. Thus, even if one could craft a program that
had no class-based discrimination, any rule subsidizing gardening but
not community organizing would inevitably cause a shift of time and
energy away from politics towards the subsidized activities. If, as
Habermas persuasively argues, public engagement is already too
weak, then it makes no sense to discriminate against it. Here, then,
are eight ideas on what government could to help groups form online-
and off.
76 See generally Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative Democracy in Cyberspace:
The Role of the Cyber-Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. SC. & TECH. L. 1 (2003).
77 Cf AMY GuTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (Princeton University Press 1988).
78 Clay Shirky, Social Software and the Politics of Groups (Networks, Economics, and
Culture mailing list), March 9, 2003, http://shirky.com/writings/group_politics.html.
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A. INFRASTRUCTURE
The state's most important role is in creating a climate in which
groups can form, and in ensuring the provision of resources that they
can use to organize themselves, govern themselves, and achieve their
aims. Given the speed at which communities such as Slashdot (with
more than a million members) and the so-called blogosphere are
forming, much may be achievable with little in the way of direct state
intervention. There are, nonetheless, some areas where government
action would be helpful and appropriate.
Rather than subsidize individual participants in groups,
governments should seek to subsidize facilitative technologies. The
importance of this element cannot be overstated. For starters,
because of their characteristic as public goods, and because the
providers are mostly in the regulated industries of
telecommunications and cable, the government has an inevitable role
in ensuring the provision of the infrastructures needed to make
Internet communication easy and cheap.79 The Internet works only
for those able to get Internet access. Governments can and should
pursue a strategy of democratizing access to communications. Subject
to a need for basic literacy, online participation is something that can
be done from the home or library (although, at present, library users
seem to be severely rationed) and thus potentially becomes available
to as wide a group of participants as anything else on offer at present.
Although the 'Digital Divide' 8° is at least temporarily real, there are an
79 See, e.g., Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
Management, 89 MINN. L. REv. 917 (2005); Brett Frischmann, Privatization and
Commercialization of the Internet Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into
Government and Government Intervention into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCi. & TECH. L. REV.
1 (June 8, 2001).
so'"[T]he digital divide' means that between countries and between different groups of
people within countries, there is a wide division between those who have real access to
information and communications technology and are using it effectively, and those who
don't. Since information and communications technologies (ICTs) are increasingly
becoming a foundation of our societies and economies, the digital divide means that the
'information have-nots' are denied the option to participate in new ICT jobs, in e-
government, in ICTs fi-proved healthcare, and in ICT enhanced education. More often
than not, the 'information have-nots' are in developing countries, and in dis-advantaged
groups within countries."
What is the Digital Divide?, BRIDGES.ORG, Jan. 4, 2oo6,
http://web.archive.org/web/20o6olO413o81io/http://www.bridges.org/digitaldivide/inde
x.html.
[Vol. 5:1
impressive number of community-based projects in the U.S. seeking
to provide a free or low-cost infrastructure for Internet access. Some
are FreeNets-free Internet Service Providers 81-while others are
ambitious projects to provide free wireless Internet connections to
neighborhoods and even cities.8 2 Even with free bandwidth, one still
needs a device that can access the Internet: governments should
ensure that public access is widely available in libraries, schools, and
public kiosks.
Political and social programs based on information technologies
are particularly open to criticism given the class-based differences in
access to the technologies. Data suggest that wealthier and more
educated people are more likely to make use of the Internet. A similar
problem besets participation in community activities. As Demos put
it:
Affluent people are more likely to participate in Pro-Am
activities than those on low incomes. Incomes may in part
reflect differences in educational qualifications .... Men
are more likely to be Pro-Am than women, especially
women with children. When women do participate they tend
to engage in home-based activities that can be scheduled
flexibly to fit in with childcare. Men are far more likely to
engage in Pro-Am activities that involve a commitment to
clubs and activities that take them away from home.... To
the extent that these 'social' Pro-Am activities bring
additional benefits-access to networks, social contacts and
support-women are doubly disadvantaged. The group most
likely to engage in and organize Pro-Am activities comprises
well-educated, relatively affluent men. The group least
8 i See, e.g., Community Computer Networks, Free-Nets and City-Regional Guides,
http://victoria.tc.ca/Resources/freenets.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2009); Freenets &
Community Networks, http://www.lights.ca/freenet (last visited Nov. 19, 2009);
PersonalTelco, Wireless Communities,
http://www.personaltelco.net/index.cgi/WirelessCommunities (last visited Nov. 19,
2oo8).
82 See generally ROB FLICKENGER, BUILDING WIRELESS COMMUNITY NETWORKS
(O'Reilly 2002); see also Rob Flickenger, Antenna on the Cheap(er, Chip), O'REILLY
NETWORKS, July 5, 2001, http://www.oreillynet.com/lpt/wlg/4 48 (describing use of tools
such as empty Pringles cans for antennas).
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likely to be Pro-Ams comprises low-income women, with
children and few educational qualifications.83
Unfortunately, in the U.S. currently there are a number of state
and national legislative proposals that prevent localities from
providing free DSL or WiFi services either free8 4 or on terms similar to
municipal water, sewer or electricity.8 5 These measures are often
justified on the theory that in a capitalist economy the state should not
enter markets that could be served by private firms. 86 There are,
however, a number of potential advantages to municipal provision of a
communications infrastructure, including lower subscriber costs and
wider availability of the services, especially in poorer communities,
and localities should be allowed, even encouraged, to embrace them.
Similarly, the government's regulatory power should not be used
to block the deployment of technologies such as GNU radio,8 7 which
has been described as "a steppingstone to the ultimate hybrid device:
a handheld PC that can be converted into a walkie-talkie one minute
and an HDTV the next."88 Similarly, Participatory Culture already
distributes Miro, an open source Bittorrent-based player for internet
TV, a software package that will allow users to subscribe to channels
and will allow organizations to provide new sources of channels to
83 Demos, supra note 4, at 6o-6i.
84 E.g., David Bollier, Minneapolis Goes Wireless, ONTHECOMMONS.ORG, April 13, 2005,
http://web.archive.org/web/20071215163452/http://onthecommons.org/node/543 (free
WiFi in city of Minneapolis). On the social benefits of municipal WiFi, see generally
WILLIAM J. MITCHELL, WIRELESS SPACE AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE,
http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/democracy-conference-papers.pdf.
85 See generally Jim Hu and Marguerite Reardon, Cities Brace for Broadband War, CNET
NEWS, May 2, 2005, http://news.com.com/Cities+brace+for+broadband+war/2009-
1034_3-5680305.html.
86 See Ramsey F. Kawar, Competing With City Hall: Local Government Entry Into The
Telecommunications Marketplace, 17 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 169
(2000) (surveying ideological arguments over municipal broadband).
87 The latest version of GNU Radio, version 3.1.3, became available on August, 23 2008.
See GNU Radio, Welcome to GNU Radio!, http://gnuradio.org/trac/wiki (last visited Jan.
21, 2009).
88 Sam Williams, Radio Free Software, SALON.COM, Dec. 18, 2002,
http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2oo2/12/18/gnu_radio.
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their fans with no bandwidth costs.89 Even more unfortunately, copy-
protection requirements threaten to make stillborn a whole class of
tools which would ease participation by those whose education or
impairments make them uncomfortable reading or writing.9O
And, last but not least, the government has a role in regulating
how infrastructure providers-and perhaps also the providers of key
types of social software-collect and manage the information that they
collect about users. Participants in Internet-based discursive
communities, not to mention online activists, may find their speech
and participation chilled by the knowledge that others are keeping
extensive records of their activities. At the very least, the government
should mandate transparency about record-keeping policies. But,
more is likely to be required, as a world in which every email and
Meetup invitation acceptance is recorded is one in which some
participants will feel pressure to self-censor while others will drop out
altogether.91
B. ENSURING A HOSPITABLE LEGAL CLIMATE
The state has a role in protecting the participants in online
activities from lawsuits designed to chill their participation-
especially since it is law, a governmental action, which creates the
danger in the first place. SLAPP suits-Strategic Lawsuits Against
Public Participation92-are a danger to any participant in group that
89 See http://www.getmiro.com (last visited Jan. 21, 2009) and
http://www.participatoryculture.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
90 See American Library Association, Digital Rights Management and Accessibility,
http://www.ala.org/ala/aboutala/offices/oitp/emailtutorials/accessibiitya/io.cfm (last
visited Feb. 2, 2009) (noting that "Digital Rights Management (DRM) poses particular
problems for individuals with print and visual disabilities who use screen readers or other
print to speech or print to Braille devices to access content").
91 A third likely response among some is the deployment of anonymizing tools. These
impose a number of costs on participation. They may be costly and cumbersome to use.
The effect of anonymity on disclosure is a complex question. Some may find it
empowering; others may be empowered into mischief. Recipients of may mistrust
anonymous communication. Strong anonymity also makes it far more complex to
establish the sort of persistent identities that one ordinarily needs to establish the sort of
discourse beloved by democratic theorists.
92 The California anti-SLAPP project defines a SLAPP suit as:
Civil complaints or counterclaims (against either an individual or an
organization) in which the alleged injury was the result of petitioning or free
speech activities protected by the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
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engages a public issue in writing, and the more so if the writing
appears virtually in a form, or forum, that can be ready by anyone.
So-called "cyber-SLAPP" suits target those who host allegedly libelous
anonymous comments made by others. 93 These lawsuits are an
example of a collective action problem: the victims are alone, often
lacking in resources to defend themselves. Effective silencing of just a
few voices can, however, have substantial externalities when the
example is not lost on others.
Several U.S. states have anti-SLAPP laws94 which seek to protect
public discussions against those who would shut them down because
they are being criticized. These laws allow defendants to stop SLAPP
suits at an early stage in the proceeding. Jurisdictions that lack such
protections, or which do not extend them to cyber-SLAPP cases,
should be encouraged to offer legal safe harbors, at least for public
criticism of politicians and corporations and public figures if not
necessarily for attacks on private citizens. Alternately, if too many
states do not act, there may be a role for federal legislation.
SLAPPs are often brought by corporations, real estate developers, or government
officials and entities against individuals who oppose them on public issues.
Typically, SLAPPs are based on ordinary civil tort claims such as defamation,
conspiracy, and interference with prospective economic advantage.
While most SLAPPs are legally meritless, they effectively achieve their principal
purpose: to chill public debate on specific issues. Defending a SLAPP requires
substantial money, time, and legal resources and thus diverts the defendant's
attention away from the public issue. Equally important, however, a SLAPP also
sends a message to others: you, too, can be sued if you speak up.
Every year thousands of people are hit with SLAPPs for such activities as writing
a letter to a newspaper, reporting misconduct by public officials, speaking at
public meetings, filing complaints with officials over violations of labor laws or
health and safety laws, 'whistleblowing' in corporations, or organizing tenants.
What are SLAPPs, California Anti-SLAPP Project,
http://www.casp.net/slapps/mengen.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
93 See CyberSLAPPs: Company lawsuits against anonymous Internet Posters, California
Anti-SLAPP Project, http://www.casp.net/slapps/cyberslapp.html (last visited Jan. 21,
2009).
94 See Other states: statutes and cases, California Anti-SLAPP Project,
http://www.casp.net/statutes/menstate.html for a list (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
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C. POLICING THE MARKET
The state has an active role to play in policing markets for
communications technologies to prevent anti-competitive and
predatory behavior. Anti-trust vigilance is essential to ensure that no
software or hardware maker can exert control over citizens' means of
communications to ensure that citizens enjoy the full benefit of the
network effects of these new technologies. If group-formation and
self-governance is going to be enhanced by access to information and
to communicative tools, then attention needs to be paid to the nature
of the markets for those products. Unfortunately, there are powerful
tendencies in both software and hardware markets towards winner-
take-all outcomes that can create monopolies over tools needed for
communication. 95 The government can, both by regulatory and
purchasing choices, ensure that it does not encourage these
tendencies. Similarly, the state should encourage the production of
information in the open source and creative commons96 models rather
than continue to strengthen intellectual property rights. 97
Encouraging people to put their works wholly or partly into the public
domain enriches discourse. Too much intellectual property protection
can stifle discourse.98 (At some point, too little intellectual property
protection is also harmful, but we are nowhere near there at present.)
D. THE STATE AS HONEST (DATA) BROKER
The state has an essential role to play as provider of reliable data
about the national condition and the world, and as honest archivist.
The Library of Congress, a digital National Archive, and every bureau
95 Copyright is also a form of monopoly. While copyright extensions clearly do not serve
the course of encouraging discourse, given the excessive length of the original term, it is
not likely that the recent extensions upheld in Eldred v. Ashcroft, substantially increase the
already great burden. 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
96 See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Jan. 21, 2009).
97 See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or Linux and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J.
369, 445-46 (2002).
98 See generally Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUMB. L. REV.
257 (2006); Pamela Samuelson, The Copyright Grab, WIRED, Jan. 1996,
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/4.ol/white.paper-pr.html (explaining that an
increase in copyright protection, such as greater publisher control over Internet sources, is
not sound public policy because the increased protection will stifle public access to
knowledge and public discourse about important events).
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of statistics are critical support institutions for an engaged citizenry.
To be relevant and useful, political discourse needs facts about what
governments are doing, what they have done, and as much reliable
information as possible about the rest of the world. The government
can serve as honest purveyor of raw data, and as reliable archive of
information- an especially important role given the ease of digital
forgery. Furthermore, the government's ability to set reporting
standards takes on added importance in this connection because a
common data format enables a world of easy comparisons that would
otherwise be much more difficult. Food labeling regulations that
require packed foods to report ingredients, fat, calories, and other
dietary information in a standard format provides a model of this type
of standardization.99 By setting standards for the presentation of data,
and in some cases collecting and reporting reliable data, the state can
set the stage for informed debate on what the data tells us, rather than
on what the data might be.
One problem, however, is that the temptation for governments to
become propagandists seems almost irresistible. In the U.S., the
government has been caught producing fake news videos. loo In
Europe, the European Commission has not sunk quite that low, but its
recent campaign to 'educate' citizens as to the benefits of the
European constitution was certainly one-sided.1°1 Government has a
role in providing information for the public, especially reliable
statistical data. But the task of fairly setting out all the different
possible sides is one that government will find hard to do; even if it is
done well, it will be criticized by those who think their side is entitled
to pride of place.
99 See Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. 101-535,104 Stat. 2353
(199o), and implementing rules at 21 C.F.R. § lol et seq. Of course for a standard to work
it has to identify meaningful data, and it has to be observed. There are accounting
standards that define reporting requirements for listed companies, but that has not
stopped a succession of major companies from cooking their books.
-oo See, e.g., Ceci Connolly, Drug Control Office Faulted for Issuing Fake News Tapes,
WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2oo5, A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A54651-2osJan6.html.
101 The Commission recently issued a White Paper on European Governance, available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/govemance/white-paper/indexen.html. For a scathing
critique of the paper, describing "the invocation of a European public space ... [as] a
conspicuous ruse in its attempt to enhance its own position in a specific institutional
setting," see Alexander Somek, Democratic Minimalism: Turning the Clock Back from
Democracy to Democratization (Jan. 2005), U. Iowa Legal Studies Research Paper No.
05-1o, available at http://ssm.com/abstract=672224.
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E. FIGHTING DISCURSIVE SABOTAGE
The state may have a role in helping people fight spam and other
forms of discursive sabotage. Online communications in general
continue to be burdened with high levels of spam; meanwhile, unless
they are designed with community moderation in mind, virtual
communities frequently find that they are vulnerable to other forms of
discursive sabotage. Spam has now reached epidemic proportions
and is causing a significant fraction of users to rely less on email.
According to a survey by the Pew Internet and American Life Project,
18% of email users say that spam has reduced their overall use of
email, and a large fraction of email users say spam has made being
online unpleasant or annoying. (Interestingly, these numbers have
tended gently downward over a three-year period).102 One does not
know, however, if this means the problem is cumulating or
ameliorating.) If the exponential growth of email spam continues,
email may no longer be a useful tool. Meanwhile, spammers have
aimed their messages at blogs, wikis, slash servers and other
community software. It would be disastrous to give governments the
power to directly censor content, but governments may have a role in
providing users with tools that they can use to defend themselves
against spam.
F. CREATING LOCALIZED VIRTUAL PUBLIC FORA
Governments may have a special role in creating a market for
certain kinds of software and in very special cases perhaps even
hosting the software on government computers. Governments should
recognize that Meetup-style services are essential to group formation.
If the industry moves towards a charging model, governments should
investigate the elasticity of demand for meeting-creation services. If
demand is elastic (is sensitive to price), then governments should offer
the service for free, or encourage the provision of free private Meetup
services. Given the evidence noted above that there is a "virtuous
circle between ICT use and more traditional neighbourly relations,"103
governments might also wish to encourage the development of highly
102 In the most recent survey, 19% of users said spam has reduced their overall use of email,
down from 22% in 2005, 29% in 2004, and 25% in 2003. Deborah Fallows, Adjusting to a
Diet of Spain, PEW RESEARCH (Pew Internet and American Life Project), May 23, 2007,
http://pewresearch.org/pubs/487/spam.
103 See supra text accompanying note 45.
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localized versions of Friendster that could be marketed as social
icebreakers rather than as romance sites.o4
Similarly, in an effort to encourage local government to use social
software to involve citizens in decision-making, the state and federal
governments could subsidize its production or purchase it in bulk and
then give it to interested localities. Government demand for open-
source decision-enabling tools could create a paying market that
would stimulate open source software designers to improve their
products.
G. MINI-AGORAS: NEW STRUCTURES FOR VIRTUAL WORKERS
Just as the state regulated labor relations by defining the role of
unions in the centralized workplace, so too the state may have a role in
creating new unions, or substitutes for unions, in the new
decentralized workplace. A digital workers fights policy should
include a component that encourages digital or even physical
meetings at which workers could socialize, network, share skills- and
foster their solidarity.
As work moves into the virtual realm, both the union hall and the
workplace centered unionization campaign will become anachronisms
for an increasing fraction of the workforce. If we believe that unions
are a valuable social institution for knowledge workers as well as
traditional skilled and unskilled trades, then it is likely that some
mechanism will be needed to encourage those affiliations to form.
Mancur Olson's work reminds us that they will not form easily on
their own. And whether or not it takes the form of a union, if work is
increasingly something that is outsourced to the home rather than
taking place in the office, there will be an increased need for
institutions that get people out of the house or else the social capital of
the groups organized around the workplace will be at risk.
Realistically, developments of this sort are more likely in Europe,
where there is a tradition of co-determination and worker
participation, than in the U.S. where most businesses are quite happy
to be rid of their unions. But even if the new bodies are not unions butjust bowling leagues, book clubs or group fitness sessions, there may
be a role for government in creating structures-literally, in the form
104 Cf. Demos, supra note 4, at 64, 67 ("A new project for the open source software
movement would be to create a version of the Friendster social networking website as a
way of helping people to link up with others with similar interests in their
neighbourhoods.").
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of meeting rooms, gymnasia, and meeting halls-that would be
available for everyone's use.
H. LEVERAGING THE EMPOWERMENT OF THE STANDARD FORM
Last, but not least, while it would be impossible to craft a one-size-
fits-all solution to the internal governance needs of what are currently
an extraordinarily heterogeneous variety of virtual fora, it is not too
soon to try to craft solutions to specific and observable problems.
Rather than try to craft model constitutions or bylaws for groups that
will be as variable as the human imagination, running from
lightweight mailing lists to complex virtual worlds, it would be better
to offer services that designers of virtual spaces and participants in
those spaces could avail themselves of when they need them.
One possibility might be to attempt to design circuit breakers for
familiar discursive pathologies. For example, one problem that seems
to crop up time and again in fora as disparate as mailing lists and
virtual worlds is the absence of a dispute settlement mechanism.
Virtual communities often have very lightweight governance
structures. Even those which are somewhat more thought-out are of
necessity new or old forms adapted to new circumstances. Inevitably
unprecedented disputes occur, ambiguities are found or the collective
finds that it needs a way to prevent part of the group from out-
shouting the rest. Mailing lists are notoriously vulnerable to 'flame
wars' or find that their community is being distracted by procedural
wrangles, most often over what ground rules should govern posting
rights to the list.1°5 Advising the community to migrate to a new list if
it is unhappy with some of the participants in the old is not much of a
solution if the troublemakers follow along, especially if they use
pseudonyms.
Disputes of these sorts are ill-suited for traditional terrestrial
courts. The non-commercial issues at stake-how a virtual
community should be governed-do not involve the type of issues that
courts are likely to think they have jurisdiction over. Venue questions
will be far more complex than a small-dollar-value matter justifies.
Nor, for that matter, would many courts know much about how to
resolve them. There is no traditional property at stake (and often no
intellectual property as such), and to the extent that it would find
"property" in the right to a list's name, it belongs to whoever runs the
1o5 Note that some virtual communities deal with this problem by encoding norms of
community moderation into the environment. See supra text at page 151.
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machine or owns the account that hosts the software. If the question
is who owns the clubhouse for a club that meets in a virtual world, a
court is likely to apply rules that will feel and in fact be arbitrary to
many of the participants. If there are written, oral or even implied
contracts, they will likely be silent on the issues at stake; in any case
many disputes of this type may require the application of equity or at
least of a law sensitive to the evolving customs and folkways of the
Internet generally, of the type of virtual community and software at
issue, not to mention sensitivity to the legal and cultural expectations
of participants who will in some cases be geographically concentrated
but at other times will be internationally diverse.
Disputes about the nature and practice of self-government of
online communities call out for a new type of neutral and external
referee- a light-weight online arbitration, the cyber equivalent of a
court, or perhaps rather of a small-claims court, but one empowered
to primarily do equity rather than law.106 Quality arbitration costs,
and the expense of bringing problems of this nature to a traditional
arbitrator, would be prohibitive for most virtual communities which,
after all, may not have legal personality, a clearly defined membership
or a bank account. Just as states staff and subsidize their courts in the
interest of providing a trusted and neutral means for citizens to
resolve their disputes, so too might governments establish an Office of
the Referee to arbitrate online disputes about the governance of
virtual spaces.
Like an arbitrator, an online Referee could offer binding opinions
when the parties agreed in advance to be bound. Unlike a court, the
Referee would have no power to compel participation- a concept of
dubious applicability in disputes where the parties may be
international, or may have masked their identities behind digital
persona. And unlike both arbitrators and courts, the Referee might
also be allowed to educate participants and the public by giving
advisory opinions when invoked by fewer than all the parties to a
dispute. Like a court, the Referee could charge a small filing fee to
discourage frivolous requests, but the state would both select the
Referee and subsidize her operations. The creation of a publicly
1o6 This skates perilously close to the idea that cyberspace should be treated as a
jurisdiction of its own, cf. David Post & David R. Johnson, Law and Borders: The Rise of
Law in Cyberspace, 48 STANFORD L. REv. 1367 (1996), but does not, I think, cross over to
it, as the relevant rules should be informed by the expectations of the participants, which
will in ordinary cases be drawn not just from internet folkways but from the legal systems
with which they are familiar. Thus, decisions will vary not just with the type of virtual
environment, but with the type of participants.
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financed institution to arbitrate and educate is a Habermasian
solution to the goal of nurturing self-governance of virtual groups and
indeed might be extended to physical ones as well. So long as
participation is voluntary, and no one is coerced, the settlement of
otherwise intractable disputes by third parties is a shortcut fully
consistent with discourse ethics. And, again, if participation is not
voluntary and the Referee's decision is only advisory-educative-that
too is fully consistent with the Habermasian vision.
V. CODA
Whether it is the first President Bush's "thousand points of light"
or then-Candidate Obama's paean to the transformative power of the
ordinary citizen rising to extraordinary challenges, we are regularly
treated to exhortations from on high about the value of citizen
activism and small-bore collective action. This essay has explored
whether there is more that governments might do than pay lip service
to group formation while still not becoming so heavy handed as to risk
undermining the virtues of collective self-organization.
Thus Demos's challenge in The Pro-Am Revolution: can
governmental power be enlisted to aid decentralized self-organizing
and self-governing groups? The difficulty, of course, is that existing
governments are the institutions that in the long run have the most to
lose from the growth of rivals who might claim to have greater
legitimacy. In the short run, however, governments have much to
gain, as do we all. Involvement and participation in all kinds of
groups, including those with no political objective, can benefit both
individuals and communities. Even if governments are willing to act,
the economic obstacles to group formation remain formidable. There
is also a danger that any governmental policy that sought to 'pick
winners' would be smothering.
If we will not follow Demos down the road of direct subsidy, can
indirect policies also serve? A better policy would be for the
government to create a legal climate in which groups can flourish both
on and off line, and to provide generally facilitative, supportive, often
non-financial resources. Below, I identify eight specific governmental
policies that could usefully be adopted in any relatively wealthy liberal
democracy to promote the formation of groups and assist them once
they are formed:
* Democratize access to communication by ensuring
that the communications infrastructure is widely
deployed, inexpensive, and of suitable quality.
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" Enact legal reform (if not already in place) to
prevent cyber-SLAPP lawsuits.
* Apply competition law aggressively to markets for
communications technologies in order to ensure that
no software or hardware maker can exert control
over citizens' means of communication.
* Provide reliable data, and act as honest archivist.
" Assist those who desire aid (but only them) to fight
spain and other forms of discursive sabotage.
" Ensure that Meetup-like services are available at low
(or no) cost (if demand for these key services proves
to be elastic as to price) and subsidize facilitative
technologies, such as group decision-making
software.
* Enact a digital workers rights policy including a
component that encourages digital or even physical
meetings.
* Provide a corps of subsidized online neutrals to
settle non-commercial disputes among members of
virtual communities.
Of course, there is only so much that communications technology
can do alone, even with government assistance. Encouraging group
formation will not by itself end poverty, raise standards of education,
equalize gender roles, solve the health care crisis, nor ensure a supply
of reliable and affordable childcare. Good software can help make
good relationships, yet cannot wholly transcend the problems that
define the society in which it is deployed. But it's a start.
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